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LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSES IN COMPUTER
RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS CONTRACTS: ARE
THEY ENFORCEABLE?
YASUE KOEZUKA

F

UN-FILLED TRAVEL AGENCY contracts with Airline
One for a five-year computer reservations system
(CRS) subscription. During the second year of the contract, Airline Two approaches Fun-Filled to persuade it to
switch to a different CRS owned by Airline Two. The new
CRS offers different and improved services which will be
useful to Fun-Filled in checking and confirming flights
and making reservations for its customers. Fun-Filled,
however, is reluctant to switch because the contract with
Airline One includes a liquidated damage clause stipulating the damages that Fun-Filled must pay if it breaches
the five-year contract. Realizing and understanding FunFilled's concerns, Airline Two promises to indemnify FunFilled for legal expenses and damages if Airline One initiates and wins a lawsuit for breach of contract. When Airline One sues Fun-Filled to enforce the liquidated damage
clause, Fun-Filled defends by alleging that the liquidated
damage clause represents a penalty and is therefore void
as a matter of law.
Though the above fact situation is a hypothetical, a
number of lawsuits are currently pending which contest
the enforceability of liquidated damage clauses in CRS
subscription contracts.' The typical case involves a new
CRS vendor attempting to enter the CRS market which is
I Godwin, Dim Outlook ForAgents In UAL Cases, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Sept. 7, 1989, at
1 [hereinafter Godwin, Dim Outlook]. For example, Texas Air is currently defend-
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already dominated by an older CRS.2 The problem that
the new CRS vendor faces is that most travel agencies are
already obligated to CRS subscription contracts containing liquidated damage clauses. Although Department of
Transportation regulations limit these contracts to five
years, 3 this restriction provides little help to a new CRS
vendor. To succeed in the CRS market, the new vendor
must either wait until the travel agency has fulfilled its obligations under its current CRS contract or promise to indemnify the travel agency for any legal expenses or
damages that result from the agency breaking its current
CRS contract.
This comment analyzes the enforceability of liquidated
damage clauses in CRS contracts by reviewing the current
law governing liquidated damages; discussing the development and role of the CRS in the travel industry; and
examining United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp.,' a

1988 case in which a court upheld a liquidated damage
clause in a CRS subscription contract.5 Furthermore, this
comment presents an analysis of the issue of whether
ing over 120 disputes, with basically the same facts as the hypothetical, against
American Airlines and United Airlines. Id.
2

Belitsos, MIS Pilots The Air Wars, COMPUTER DECISIONS, Mar. 1988, at 36, 40.

Delta Air Lines and Texas Air, both newcomers to the CRS market, use similar
tactics to win over agencies which have contracts with older CRS. Id. Neither
airline uses liquidated damage clauses in its contracts. Id. The General Accounting Office conducted an investigation and found that American Airlines' SABRE
and United Airlines' Apollo, the two oldest CRS, hold a combined 75% market

share in the industry. Proctor, House Members Call For Tighter Regulation of Reservation Systems, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 19, 1988, at 123.

:, 14 C.F.R. § 2 55.6(a) (1989). Section 255.6(a) provides that "[n]o subscriber
contract shall have a term in excess of five years." Id. A Department of Transportation report on CRS stated, however, that five-year lengths of travel agency con-

tracts may be restricting competition. Godwin, DOT Report Triggers New Debate On
Requiring Res System Changes, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Oct. 31, 1988, at 34. The American

Society of Travel Agents and newer CRS vendors have requested a three-year cap
on agreements. Id. at 35, 37.
. 681 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter Austin Travel Corp, I], ayf'd, 867
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989).
, Id. at 189. United Airlines sued Austin Travel for breach of three CRS contracts. Id. at 181. The court awarded $408,375.00 in damages to the carrier, of
which $269,684.66 represented liquidated damages. Id. at 191-92. For a detailed
discussion of this case, see infra notes 96-143 and accompanying text.
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courts should enforce such clauses or void them as penalties by applying the general principles of liquidated damage clauses to CRS subscription contracts.
I.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSES

Liquidated damage clauses are contractual provisions
which predetermine the measure of damages for breach
of contract. 6 One reason that parties include such provisions is that liquidated damage clauses help ease the calculation of damages, 7 which in turn reduces the cost of
proving complicated damages.' Furthermore, the liquidated damage provision may be the only measure of damages for an injured party when it is difficult, if not
impossible, to prove with sufficient certainty that damages
were actually sustained by the party.9 As a general rule,
courts uphold the clauses as valid to the extent they attempt to reasonably compensate the injured party for
nonperformance of the contract.10
A problem, however, arises in distinguishing between
clauses which reasonably compensate an injured party
and clauses that are unenforceable penalty clauses. " Until the early 1900's, courts were not only opposed to any
predetermined damage clauses, but they were also confused as to what conditions were required for the enforce,;See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (5th ed. 1979). "Liquidated damages is the

sum which party to contract agrees to pay if he breaks some promise and, which
having been arrived at by good faith effort to estimate actual damage that will
probably ensue from breach, is recoverable as agreed damages if breach occurs."
Id. (citing In re Plywood Co. of Pa., 425 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1970)).
7 E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 896 (1982).
8Id.
1,Id. The requirement of sufficient certainty can be described as a requirement
for satisfactory evidence to support an award of damages. Id. § 12.15, at 881.
Courts impose this requirement "to control the discretion of juries in awarding
contract damages ...." Id.
11 See Comment, Liquidated Damages: A New Rule for Texas Under the Uniform Commercial Code?, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 123 (1980).
1 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 776, at 667 (W.

Jaeger 3d ed. 1961); see also Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 862 (1982).

806

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[55

ment of the clauses.' 2 Now, courts consider some or all of
the following elements when deciding whether to enforce
a liquidated damage clause: (1) the anticipated damages
from the breach must be uncertain or difficult to prove,
(2) the parties must have intended to liquidate the damages when making their contract, and (3) the fixed damin relation to the
age amount must be reasonable
3
anticipated loss or injury.'
A.

Uncertainty or Difficulty of Proof

The Restatement of Contracts, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code
have all adopted the common law requirement that liquidated damage clauses are not enforceable unless the anticipated damages are uncertain or difficult to prove.' 4 An
example of damages that are difficult to prove are damages resulting from a contractor's failure to timely complete a construction project. Construction contracts,
therefore, often include a stipulation requiring a contractor to pay a specific sum for each day the contractor delays
in completing a project.' 5 Another example of uncertain
damages are those which result from a breach of a cove12 See Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 Il1. 510, 117 N.E. 777, 778 (1917) ("no branch
of the law is involved in more obscurity by contradictory decisions than whether a
sum specified in an agreement ... will be treated as liquidated damage or a penalty"); Note, supra 11, at 862-63.
I See Hanson Dev. Co. v. East Great Plains Shopping Center, Inc., 195 Conn.
60, 485 A.2d 1296, 1300 (1985); Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 732, 118
A.2d 311, 315 (1955); Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 89 Conn. 51, 92 A. 665, 667
(1914).
14

U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978) ("[d]amages for breach ... may be liquidated ...

at

an amount which is reasonable in the light of ... the difficulties of proof of loss");
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1)(b) (1932) ("the harm that is caused by the
breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979) ("[d]amages for breach... may be
liquidated .

.

. but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of ...

the

difficulties of proof of loss").
15United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907). In this landmark
Supreme Court case, a provision which required the contractor to pay thirty-five
dollars per gun carrier per day of delay was held valid because of the uncertainty
of the damage to the United States government. Id. at 118; see also Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 89 Conn. 51, 92 A. 665 (1914) (stipulated damages of fifteen
dollars per day for delay in delivery of a yacht upheld).
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nant not to compete.' 6 Such damages include harm to a
which is usually both unbusiness' goodwill or reputation
7
prove.'
to
difficult
and
certain
Courts, however, seem to take the uncertainty or difficulty of proof of loss as an element to consider, rather
than a necessary condition, in determining whether to enforce a liquidated damage clause. Though courts will usually demand more accurate estimation of resulting
damages in order to deem the amount as reasonable,
courts will still uphold liquidated damage clauses where
the damages are neither uncertain nor difficult to prove.' 8
For instance, in contracts for the purchase of real estate,
courts frequently uphold clauses calling for the forfeiture
of earnest money deposits as liquidated damages even
though such damages are easily calculable since courts
can order specific performance of these contracts. 19
Courts, therefore, can easily calculate the damages by taking the difference between the contract price and the
price received at a forced sale. Courts also regularly uphold accelerated rental clauses in leases as enforceable
liquidated damage clauses. 20 Damages from a breach of a
lease usually are not difficult to prove, and an acceleration
clause simply totals the rents due for the remaining
months of a contract and makes the sum payable upon a
breach. 2 l Thus, given the variance of the courts' empha" E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 12.18, at 899 n.18.

Id.
- See id. § 12.18, at 899-900. ("the ease of forecasting and proving the loss may
make it incumbent on the parties to make a more accurate forecast if it is to be
sustained as reasonable .... ").
- See Zucht v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 207 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947). The court held "a provision for liquidated damages in the contract for the
Id.
I..."at 419; see also Biesinger v.
sale and purchase of real estate is proper .
Behunin, 584 P.2d 801 (Utah 1978) (provision for forfeiture of amounts paid as
liquidated damages upheld by court). But see Freeman v. Warrior, 409 F.2d 1101
(10th Cir. 1969). The Tenth Circuit held that liquidated damages are not applicable in real estate contracts because the damages are not difficult to ascertain. An
Oklahoma statute required that damages "be impracticable or extremely difficult
to fix" before a liquidated damage clause would be valid. Id. at 1103.
2-' See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 8.18, at 619-20.
21 Id. § 8.18, at 619. Under an acceleration clause, "if the debtor is in breach as
17
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sis on this element, contracting parties must be careful
when liquidating an easily determinable damage amount.
B.

Intention of the Parties

Courts have placed the least importance on the requirement that the parties must have intended to liquidate the
damages in advance. Judicial intolerance of penalty
clauses which insure performance of a contract causes
courts to examine the actual effect of the clause when determining whether it is enforceable.22 Consequently, the
parties' characterization of the provision as a liquidated
damage clause is immaterial if the effect of the clause is to
compel performance by a party. 23 Furthermore, the parties' characterization of a provision
as a penalty or forfei24
controlling.
not
also
is
ture
C.

Reasonable Amount

Of the three elements, the most conflict and confusion
exists concerning the requirement that the amount stipulated in the liquidated damage clause be reasonable in relation to the anticipated loss or injury from the breach of
the contract. The traditional approach is to judge the reasonableness of the stipulated amount at the time the parties entered into the contract. 25 Under this approach,
courts allow the recovery of liquidated damages if the parto one installment, all the remaining installments become due, either automatically or at the option of the creditor." Id.§ 8.18, at 620.
- See 5 S.WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 776, at 670-72. "[T]he fact that parties
do or do not call a provision a penalty is not conclusive of its character." Id.
2 Id.; see Massman Constr. Co. v. City Council of Greenville, Miss., 147 F.2d
925 (5th Cir. 1945). The court held that when evaluating liquidated damages,
"the main endeavor of the Court is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and
that must be gleaned from the circumstances surrounding them and from a consideration of the purposes and provisions of the whole contract. Nomenclature is
not controlling ...... Massman Constr. Co., 147 F.2d at 927 (citation omitted).
21

5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 776, at 670.

-,E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 12.18; see also Banta v. Stamford Motor Co.,
89 Conn. 51, 92 A. 665, 667 (1914). In this 1914 case, the court held that "the
standard of measure here is not furnished by the plaintiffs actual loss or injury ...
but by loss or injury which might reasonably have been anticipated at the time the

contract was made." Banta, 89 Conn. at 51, 92 A. at 667 (emphasis added).
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ties have reasonably estimated the damages that are ex26
pected to result from nonperformance of the contract.
However, if the stipulated damages are unreasonable or
disproportionate to the anticipated loss from the nonperformance, courts hold that the provisions are unenforceable penalties. 7
Though the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 28 and

the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement
2d) 2 9 require that the stipulated damage amount be reasonable with regard to the anticipated loss, they differ
from the traditional approach in that they place additional
emphasis on the actual damages. Both the UCC and the
Restatement 2d judge the reasonableness of the stipulated amount in light of actual damages as well as anticipated damages.3 0 Thus, a breaching party could raise as a
defense to the enforcement of the clause that the injured
party suffered little or no damages. 3 '
The following subsections provide an analysis of the
See supra note 15.
Note, supra note 11, at 863 (citing Bignall v. Gould, 119 U.S. 495 (1886)).
Preset damage provisions which were "disproportionate to the damage which
26
27

could have been anticipated from breach of the contract... [were] agreed upon in
order to enforce performance .

. . ."

Id. Therefore, the provision was an unen-

forceable penalty. Id.; see also Chicago House-Wrecking Co. v. United States, 106
F. 385 (7th Cir. 1901) (stipulated damage amounts were penalties).
" U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978). Section 2-718(1) provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
Id.
I2' RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979).
Section 356(1)
provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of
proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages
is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.
Id.
.. For the language of UCC section 2-718(l) and Restatement (Second) of Con-

tracts section 356(1), see supra notes 28-29.
31 See Note, supra note 11, at 876.
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different methods used by courts to determine the reasonableness of specified damages in liquidated damage
clauses. Most jurisdictions have adopted one of these
approaches.
1.

Common Law

Courts view the common law as the traditional approach to determining reasonabless. Early cases emphasized "freedom of contract" and enforced the liquidated
damage clauses when the parties had made reasonable attempts to estimate the losses from an anticipated
breach.3 These courts regarded nonenforcement of an
otherwise valid liquidated damage clause as an infringement on the parties' freedom of contract." Judges deferred to the parties' decision as to what was a
"reasonable" amount and tended to uphold liquidated
damage clauses unless a party proved fraud or illegality.3 4
This emphasis on the parties' freedom of contract often
resulted in enforcing liquidated damage clauses even
when the injured party sustained little or no loss. 3 5
Some common law courts, however, allowed the
breaching party to use as a defense the fact that the other
party had suffered no actual damages. 3 6 In fact, courts occasionally invalidated liquidated damage clauses for equitable reasons even though the parties had made a
reasonable estimate of anticipated losses. 37 Still, some
:12 Id. at 863 ("Judicial encouragement of freedom of contract has been important throughout American legal history.").
:... Id. at 864; see Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal.
1940).
.1 Note, supra note 11, at 864; see Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183
U.S. 642 (1902). The Supreme Court held that "[i]f [the parties] are competent
to contract within the prudential rules the law has fixed as to [them], and there has
been no fraud, circumvention or illegality in the case, the court is bound to enforce the agreement." Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 183 U.S. at 669-70.
:15 See Note, supra note 11, at 866. "An evidentiary rule arose as a corollary to
the freedom of contract analysis. Because the plaintiff need not plead or prove
actual damage in order to recover, the defendant could not introduce evidence of
the absence of damage." Id. (footnote omitted).
:11Id.
:I7 Id. at 866 n.32, citing Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407

1990]

COMMENTS

811

courts continued to apply the strict common law rule
rather than temper rulings with equitable concerns.3
Thus, under the common law, it is difficult to predict the
result of a case in which the liquidated damages differ
greatly from the actual losses. 9
2.

Restatement of Contracts Section 339

Section 339 of the Restatement of Contracts (Restatement) follows the common law and provides a two-part
test to determine the validity and enforceability of a liquidated damage clause. 4 0 The first part requires that the
stipulated amount be a reasonable estimate of the damages at the time the parties entered into the contract. 4 '
The second requirement provides that the harm caused
by the breach must be difficult to ascertain.42 Hence, the
Restatement follows the common law approach of giving
deference to the parties' freedom of contract and their
reasonable estimate of anticipated damages when they entered into the contract. Courts following the Restatement, however, do not consider the equities of a case and
will enforce a liquidated damage
provision even if the
4 3
loss.
actual
no
in
results
breach
(1947) (liquidated damages for delay in obtaining inspection certificate void as a
penalty because delay did not affect delivery of the goods), and Massman Constr.
Co. v. City Council of Greenville, Miss., 147 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1945) (liquidated
damages for delay in bridge construction unenforceable because the bridge was
completed before the road leading to it was finished).
-"Note, supra note 11, at 867.
See id.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1) (1932). Section 339(1) provides:
An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages
recoverable for the breach, unless (a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast ofjust compensation for the harm that is caused by
the breach, and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that
is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.
Id.
Id. § 339(1)(a).
Id. § 339(1)(b).
.13
Note, supra note 11, at 869 n.49, citing McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297
P.2d 981 (1956). The McCarthy court relied on United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907), and section 339 of the first Restatement and concluded
that evidence of actual damages could not be admitted. McCarthy, 46 Cal. 2d at
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Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-718(1)

The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides a departure from the traditional approach ofjudging the reasonableness of a stipulated amount in a liquidated
damage clause. Under section 2-718(1), parties may
agree to liquidated damages only if the stipulated amount
is reasonable in relation to the anticipated or actual harm
resulting from the breach. 4 The section further provides
that courts evaluate the stipulated damages in light of the
uncertainty of damages and the lack of other adequate
remedies.45 The UCC approach differs from the common
law approach by allowing courts to consider evidence of
actual damages when determining the reasonableness and
enforceability of a liquidated damage clause. Thus, in situations where the breach causes no injury, the UCC mandates that courts not enforce the liquidated damage
clauses.
A literal interpretation of the UCC language, however,
may result in a deviation from the results of both common
law and equity. 6 Since the UCC states that the standard
for the validity of a liquidated damage clause is the reasonableness in relation to anticipated or actual harm, it is
possible that a court could enforce a provision which was
unreasonable at the time of contracting but reasonable in
relation to actual damages. 47 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has indicated that such a result is precluded by an application of the second sentence of UCC
section 2-718(1).48 This sentence provides that a stipula577, 297 P.2d at 981. It is interesting to note, however, that the commentary to
the Restatement states that if "the breach causes no harm at all or none that is
incapable of accurate estimation without difficulty, [the liquidated damage]
amount . . . is not enforceable." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 comment e
(1932).
4 See supra note 28 for the text of section 2-718(1) of the UCC.
Id.
See Note, supra note 11, at 872. The deviation which may occur is not adequately resolved by the UCC. Id. at 872 n.64.
. Id. at 872.
-.Equitable Lumber Corp. v. I.P.A. Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 381
N.Y.S.2d 459, 344 N.E.2d 391 (1976). Equitable Lumber Corp. involved a liquidated
45

411
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tion for "unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as
a penalty." '49 Thus, courts may consider the second sentence of the section as an overarching standard parties
must meet when determining the enforceability of a liquidated damage clause. 50
Though very few courts have directly addressed the
meaning of section 2-718(1), the courts that have interpreted the section have had varying interpretations.
Some courts have construed the section as a "reasonableness" test.51 Others, because of the confusing wording of
section 2-718(1) and the difficulty of application, have interpreted the section consistently with common law on
liquidated damages.52
4.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 356

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement
2d) differs from the Restatement because it closely follows
damage provision for attorney's fees of thirty percent of the money recovered if
the buyer breached the contract. Id. at 516, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 459, 344 N.E.2d at
391. The court found that, although the provision met the reasonableness test of
the UCC, the provision did not survive the second sentence of UCC section 2718(1). Id.
41,U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
5
See 2 R. ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 13:05 (1988).
5
Id.; Note, supra note 11, at 873.
5C Comment, supra note 10, at 127 (citing Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l
Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala. App. 127, 283 So. 2d 438 (1973), and Lee Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270 (1976)); see also 2 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 50, § 13:05. In PasqualeFood Co., the contract for the sale of an aircraft
provided for forfeiture of a $10,000 deposit if the buyer failed to accept delivery
of the aircraft. PasqualeFood Co., 51 Ala. App. at 127, 283 So. 2d at 446-47. The
court held that the "[UCC] does not change the substantive law regarding liquidated damage as announced in [a 1953 common law case]." Id. at 127, 283 So. 2d
at 447. In Lee Oldsmobile, Inc., the court followed case law to determine that anticipated damages must be difficult to determine in order to enforce a liquidated
damage clause under UCC section 2-718(1). Lee Oldsmobile, Inc., 32 Md. App. at
556, 363 A.2d at 274. The court stated:
We do not say this from hindsight made possible because the actual
figures claimed were in evidence. We say it because at the time the
contract was made, it was clear that the nature of any damages which
would result from a possible future breach was such that they would
be easily ascertainable.
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UCC section 2-718(1) rather than the common law. Section 356 uses a two-part test to evaluate the validity of a
liquidated damage clause. 53 First, the stipulated amount
must be reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual
harm resulting from the breach of the contract.54 Second,
the amount must also be reasonable in light of the difficulties of proving the harm.55
Unlike the UCC's test, which provides no guidelines for
interpreting the test, the comments and illustrations to
the Restatement 2d facilitate the interpretation and application of section 356.56 The first part of the test evaluates
the reasonableness of the liquidated damage clauses at
either the time of contract (anticipated loss) or at the time
of the breach (actual lOSS). 57 The second part of the test
requires that the anticipated loss be difficult to prove. 58 A
question remains, however, as to when must the loss be
difficult to prove. 59 Though courts following the common
law evaluated the difficulty of proof of loss at the time of
,:, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979); see supra

note 29 for

the text of section 356(1) governing liquidated damages.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

54

356(1) (1979).

55Id.
51m

See Note, supra note 11, at 874-79.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979). The relevant part of
section 356(1) reads as follows: "Damages for breach . . . may be liquidated ...
but only at an amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss
.... I"
Id. Comment b clarifies the issue further by stating that the reasonableness
of the amount should be judged in light of either the anticipated or the actual loss.
Under the test stated in Subsection (1), two factors combine in determining whether an amount of money fixed as damages is so unreasonably large as to be a penalty. The first factor is the anticipated
or actual loss caused by the breach. The amount fixed is reasonable
to the extent that it approximates the actual loss that has resulted
from the particular breach, even though it may not approximate the
loss that might have been anticipated under other possible breaches
.... Furthermore, the amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that
it approximates the loss anticipated at the time of the making of the
contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss.
Id. § 356 comment b.
Id. § 356(1). The relevant part of section 356(1) provides that the amount
must be "reasonable in light of ... the difficulties of proof of loss." Id.
- Note, supra note 11, at 874-75.
57
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the making of the contract, 60 the illustrations to the Restatement 2d indicate that the time to assess the difficulty
of proof is at the time of trial.6 '
Furthermore, in determining whether the stipulated
damages are reasonable, the comments suggest balancing
(1) the reasonableness of the liquidated damage clauses in
light of anticipated or actual damages and (2) the difficulty
of proving damages.6 2 If the difficulty of proving the
damages is great, the court requires less proof of the ac- Id. at 875 ("the old rule [considered] the 'difficulty of proof of loss' from the
perspective of the making of the contract").
Id. Illustration 3 describes the following hypothetical:
A contracts to build a grandstand for B's race track for $1,000,000
by a specified date and to pay $1,000 a day for every day's delay in
completing it. A delays completion for ten days. If $1,000 is not
unreasonable in light of the anticipated loss and the actual loss to B
is difficult to prove, A's promise is not a term providing for a penalty
and its enforcement is not precluded on grounds of public policy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 356 illustration 3 (1979). Illustration 4

describes a similar situation:
The facts being otherwise as stated in illustration 3, B is delayed for
a month in obtaining permission to operate his race track so that it is
certain that A's delay of ten days caused him no loss at all. Since the
actual loss to B is not difficult to prove, A's promise is a term providing for a penalty and is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.
Id. § 356 illustration 4. The difference between the two is, that in Illustration 4,
an event occurs before trial. That is, B fails to get authorization to operate the
track. In Illustration 3, the clause is valid because B's damages are difficult to
prove. On the other hand, in Illustration 4, B's damages-none-are not difficult
to prove because B could not have operated the track. Hence, the clause is
invalid.
2

Note, supra note 11, at 875; see RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 356

comment b (1979). The part of the comment which suggests a balancing approach provides:
The second factor is the difficulty of proof of loss. The greater the
difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or of establishing
its amount with the requisite certainty (see § 351), the easier it is to
show that the amount fixed is reasonable. To the extent that there is
uncertainty as to the harm, the estimate of the court or jury may not
accord with the principle of compensation any more than does the
advance estimate of the parties. A determination whether the
amount fixed is a penalty turns on a combination of these two factors. If the difficulty of proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is
allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on
the other hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is
allowed in that approximation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment b (1979).
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curacy of the stipulated damages. 63 Conversely, if the difficulty of proving the loss is minimal, the court allows less
discrepancy between the stipulated amount and the actual
lOSS. 6 4 This balancing approach seems to suggest that
courts will look more often to actual damages when determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damage clause.
D.

Modern Treatment of Liquidated Damages

In summary, a division exists among the different jurisdictions as to which of the preceding tests should be used
to judge the reasonableness of liquidated damage
clauses.6 5 Under the common law and Restatement tests,
courts uphold liquidated damage clauses when the stipulated amounts are reasonable at the time of the making of
the contract. Courts applying these tests disregard any
evidence of actual damages. Of course, courts may always
consider the equities of the case to invalidate a liquidated
damage clause when the injured party suffered little or no
actual damages.
Under the UCC and Restatement 2d, courts evaluate
the reasonableness of a liquidated damage clause in relation to the anticipated losses and/or in light of the actual
damages. Under the UCC, an interpretive problem arises
when the stipulated damages are reasonable in light of actual damages but appeared unreasonable at the time of
contracting. Few courts have addressed whether to uphold the liquidated damages in such a situation or void
them on the grounds that they were initially adopted as
penalties. The Restatement 2d eliminates this problem by
requiring enforcement of a clause which is reasonable in
light of either anticipated or actual damages. Additionally,
the Restatement 2d requires setting aside the liquidated
damages only if no actual damages have resulted from the
breach.
'

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §

Id.
Note, supra note 11, at 879.

356 comment b (1979).
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(CRS)

In order to appreciate the implications of liquidated
damage clauses in CRS subscription contracts, it is necessary to understand both the CRS industry and the context
in which liquidated damage clauses arise in the industry.
A.

Development and Role of CRS in the Travel Industry

Though airline carriers 66 began developing CRS before
deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, the airlines
did not fully realize the importance of this development
until after deregulation.67 Deregulation increased the
number and frequency of flights, complicated the fare
structures, and added new routes to airlines' schedules.68
This "information explosion" made it impractical for
agencies to continue booking flights and issuing tickets to
their customers simply from information published in
flight schedules.69
As a result of deregulation, the CRS became a valuable
tool because it provides travel agents with information
about flight schedules, availability of seating on particular
flights, and airfares. 70 The CRS also allows agencies to
... 14 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1989). Section 255.3 defines carrier as: "any air carrier,
any foreign air carrier, and any commuter air carrier, as defined in 49 U.S.C.
1301(3), 49 U.S.C. 1301(22), and 14 C.F.R. 298.2(f), respectively that are engaged directly in the operation of aircraft in passenger air transportation." Id.
,17Belitsos, supra note 2, at 36-37.
- Id. Before deregulation "alternative fares and flying schedules had been few,
and fares changed only a few times a year." Id. at 36.
w, See id. at 36-37. The "information explosion" included increases in "'discount fares and the proliferation of new carriers and added routes'" which
" 'caused fares to change at phenomenal rates'...." Id. For example, on a flight
from Philadelphia to San Francisco, five passengers sitting in coach paid five different fares. Passenger A paid $586, B paid $483, C paid $358, D paid $229 and
E paid $124. Eichel, Deregulation's legacy: skewed fares and hassles, The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 12, 1989, at ID, col. 2.
7o 14 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1989). Section 255.3 defines a CRS as "a computerized
airline reservation system offered by a carrier or its affiliate 'to subscribers for use
in the United States that contains information about schedules, fares, rules or
availability of other carriers and that provides subscribers with the ability to make
reservations and to issue tickets." Id.; see also Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at
180. A CRS
permit[s] a travel agent to have access to a vast data bank that in-
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make reservations and issue tickets directly to their customers. 7' The data bases of a CRS, further, are not limited to airline information.72 An agency can also access
hotel, rental car, and various other travel related information through a CRS and make reservations for these services. 73 Such a system is indispensable to most travel
agencies because a CRS provides such a wide array of information. Almost ninety percent of the travel agencies in
the United States are automated as a result of the airline
industry's development of these systems. 4
The CRS owners are called system vendors.75 The five
carrier-owned CRS are: (1) American Airlines' SABRE,
(2) Delta Air Lines' DATAS II, (3) TWA and Northwest
Airlines' PARS, (4) Texas Air's SystemOne, and (5)
United Airlines' Apollo. 7 6 Besides providing information
on their own flights, each system also gives information
on participating carriers. 77 A participating carrier is an
cludes listings of flights of virtually all airlines, as well as information
on many hotels, rental car companies, and other travel services. The
agent can use the system to make bookings (or to change or cancel
bookings), to print tickets and itineraries, to store relevant information about customers and their travel plans, and to perform a variety
of other travel-related functions.
Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 180.
71 For a discussion of CRS, see supra note 70.
72 See Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 180; Belitsos, supra note 2, at
40.

SABRE's network includes nearly a million miles of data circuits and
holds the schedules of 650 airlines-some 30 million fares-and information on 16,000 hotels and 33 car rental agencies, among many
other elements. With 550 gigabytes of online storage, SABRE is the
largest nonmilitary database in the world and is likely the world's
largest private network.
Belitsos, supra note 2, at 40.
7
Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 180.
71Belitsos, supra note 2, at 36 ("Of the nearly 40,000 travel agencies in the
United States, 90 percent are automated. The airline that provides an agency's
[CRS] is up to 30 percent more likely to gain bookings on its fights ....").
75 14 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1989). Section 255.3 defines system vendor as "a carrier
or its affiliates that owns, controls or operates a system." Id.
- See Austin Travel Corp. 1,681 F. Supp. at 180-81. Texas Air's SystemOne is a

merger of Continental and Eastern Airlines' CRS. Id. at 180. In February 1990,
the Department of Justice approved the merger of Delta's DATAS II and TWA
and Northwest's PARS systems. The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 8, 1990, at ID,
col. 4.
7 14 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1989). Section 255.3 defines participating carrier as "a
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airline which contracts with a system vendor to have its
flight information placed in the particular CRS data
base.78 In return, the system vendor receives a fee from
the participating carrier for each booking made through
its system.7 9 Consequently, a CRS is not only a marketing
tool for the system vendor's own flights but is also a revenue producer from contracts entered into with participating carriers. According to an airline market analyst, a CRS
gives the system vendor a twenty percent profit margin;
whereas, the overall profit margin for an airline is only
80
eight to ten percent.

With returns such as this, it is not surprising that the
established vendors-American Airlines, United Airlines,
TWA and Northwest Airlines-zealously protect their
markets from competing vendors by inserting liquidated
damage clauses in their CRS subscription contracts. 8 '
This practice makes it very difficult and costly for travel
agencies to switch to a competitor's CRS. Two relative
newcomers to the CRS market, Delta Air Lines and Texas
Air, are trying to persuade travel agencies to switch to
carrier that has an agreement with a system vendor for display of its flight schedules, fares, or seat availability, or for the making of reservations or issuance of
tickets through a system." Id.
7. Id.
79 Id.; see also Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 186-87. "Each time a travel
agent makes a booking on an airline or with another vendor through the Apollo
Services, that airline or vendor pays a booking fee to United." Austin Travel Corp.
1, 681 F. Supp. at 187.
-" Belitsos, supra note 2, at 37. The article noted, "[a]ccording to Edward
Stackman, an airlines analyst at Wall Street brokerage Paine Webber Inc., in a
good quarter the airlines have an 8 percent to 10 percent profit margin overall,
while CRSs make as much as 20 percent profit. In 1984, SABRE netted American
a 40 percent profit." Id.
See id. at 40.
Generally when an agency seeks release from a contract with one
airline to convert to a rival's CRS, it must pay the airline for the cost
of removing the equipment and for the lost equipment rental fees.
In addition, these contracts, which typically run for five years, contain "liquidation damages" clauses that make agencies responsible
for the estimated value of the offline booking fees from rival carriers
whose passengers they would have booked.
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their systems.82 Neither of these newcomer 8 vendors
use
3
liquidated damage clauses in their contracts.
B.

Typical Liquidated Damage Clauses in CRS Subscription
Contracts

Most liquidated damage clauses in CRS subscription
contracts include some or all of the following elements:
(1) acceleration clauses for the monthly fixed service
fees which are collectible on the remainder of the
contract term;
(2) eighty to one-hundred percent recovery of the estimated lost fees the vendor would have generated by
booking reservations on participating carriers (booking fees);
(3) eighty to one-hundred percent recovery of the estimated lost variable fees that the agencies would
have paid to use the various services offered by the
CRS (variable fees); and
(4) recovery of the cost of removing the equipment
from the travel agency. 84
1. Fixed Monthly Fees
System vendors charge travel agencies a fixed monthly
service fee for use of their CRS. 85 These monthly service
fees are similar to rental charges on equipment and are
paid in addition to any other charges that a travel agency
may incur while using the CRS. The acceleration clause
simply adds together the service fees due for each month
remaining in the life of the CRS subscription contract and
makes the total due upon breach of the contract. 86
Id.; see supra note 76.
11 Belitsos, supra note 2, at 40.
Id.; see also Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 186 n.5.
I.
,See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of acceleration
clauses.
12
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Lost Booking Fees

The system vendors contract with participating carriers 87 to make the carriers' flight information available to
travel agencies through the CRS.8 8 In return, the participating carriers pay an average fee of $1.75 to $1.85 per
booking segment8 9 to the system vendors for tickets sold
through the CRS.9 ° The liquidated damage clauses dealing with lost booking fees attempt to recover from the
travel agencies those fees which the system vendor would
have received from participating carriers had the travel
agency not switched to a competitor's CRS. The amount
due is calculated by multiplying -the average number of
bookings made by the agency in previous months by (1)
the booking fee and (2) the number of months remaining
in the contract. 9 '
3.

Variable Fees

In addition to the fixed monthly service fees, travel
agencies pay variable fees to system vendors for the different services that are available through the CRS.9 2 These
services range from printing tickets and travel itineraries
to storing customer information. 9 Furthermore, most
system vendors market compatible programs for the
travel agencies' accounting and management-related
functions.94 The typical liquidated damage clause provides for recovery of these variable fees. The damage
See supra note 77 for a definition of participating carriers.
- See 14 C.F.R. § 255.5 (1989).
- "A 'segment' is the reservation of a seat on a specific flight." Mifsud, Computer Reservations Systems and Automated Market Distribution In A Deregulated Aviation
Industry, 1 J.L. & TECH. 143, 146 n. 10 (1986). For example, if a customer books a
flight from Dallas to New Orleans with a plane change in Houston, a total of four
segments is charged for the round-trip. See id.
!IId. at 146. American Airlines charges an average of $1.75 per booking segment. Id.; see also Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 191 attachment A (United
Airlines charges $1.85 per booking segment).
m Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 186 n.5.
112 Id. at 186. "Variable" charges are based on the travel agency's generation of
tickets or itineraries. Id.
Id. at 180.
17

"

d. For example, "United also markets [the] . . . Apollo Business System
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amount is calculated by multiplying the average variable
fees paid in preceding months by the number of months
remaining in the contract term.95
III.

96

UNITED AIR LINES, INC. V. AUSTIN TRAVEL CORP.

Austin Travel Corp. is the first case to directly address the
issue of the enforceability of liquidated damage clauses in
CRS contracts. 7 After the federal district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the CRS vendor and enforced such a clause against the travel agency,98 the travel
agency appealed and reasserted its position that the liquidated damage clause imposed a penalty and therefore was
void as a matter of law.99 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the travel agency and affirmed the district court's summary judgment.100
A.

District Court Decision

1. Background and Holding
This lawsuit involved the CRS subscription contracts
which covered Austin Travel's agencies in Oceanside,
Great Neck, and Mitchell Field, New York.' 0 ' In 1985,
(ABS), which is a back-office accounting system that performs travel agency accounting, reporting and management reporting functions." Id.
Id. at 186 n.5.
681 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989).
17 Since the Austin Travel Corp. decisions, the same district court issued a similar
opinion in In re "APOLLO" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System (CRS),
720 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), on April 5, 1989. In re "APOLLO" was a consolidated action involving 18 different travel agencies. Id. at 1063. As in Austin
Travel Corp., each of these agencies was persuaded to switch from Apollo to SystemOne under an agreement whereby SystemOne would indemnify the agencies
for any liabilities arising from the breach of their Apollo contracts. Id. Judge
Milton Pollack of the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the agencies' affirmative defense that the liquidated damage clauses constituted penalties and granted summary judgment to United Airlines. Id. at 1065-67;
see infra note 144 for a discussion of other decisions since the Austin Travel Corp.

case.
1- Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 189, 191.
sli'United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir.
1989) [hereinafter Austin Travel Corp. II].
Id. at 738.
Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 181.
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Austin Travel, the largest travel agency in Long Island,
New York,' 0 2 purchased a travel agency in Oceanside and
another in Great Neck. Both agencies were located on
Long Island' 0 3 and were subscribers to United's Apollo
CRS. 10 4 Before purchasing these two travel agencies,
Austin Travel used American Airline's SABRE CRS at
most of its locations. 10 5 After the acquisition, Austin
Travel assumed the Apollo CRS contract at the Great
Neck location and an Apollo Business Systems 0 6 contract
at the Oceanside location.10 7 Shortly thereafter, Austin
Travel entered two five-year Apollo contracts for its
Mitchell Field and Oceanside locations.'0 8 Austin Travel,
however, continued to use SABRE at its Mitchell Field
agency and moved SABRE into the Oceanside and Great
Neck locations a few months later.'0 9
In June 1986, Eastern Airlines wrote Austin Travel offering to indemnify Austin Travel for any liability to
United under the Apollo contracts if Austin Travel would
contract with Eastern Airlines for service with its SystemOne CRS." t0 Austin Travel subsequently notified
United that it was installing SystemOne at the Mitchell
Field location and requested that United remove the
Apollo CRS from that location."' Austin Travel further
notified United that Austin Travel did not intend to use
Oceanside's Apollo Business System, and that under an
oral agreement, Austin Travel was liable only for removal
I2Id.
-3 Id. The two agencies were Karson Travel in Oceanside, New York, and Fan-

tasy Adventures in Great Neck, New York. Id.
104

Id.

105

Id.

See supra note 94 for a description of the Apollo Business System.
Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 181.
...See id.
Id.
I ld. at 181-82. William S. Lush, who is the vice-president of Marketing Automation at Eastern Airlines, wrote to Jeffrey Austin of Austin Travel on June 3,
1986. Id.
11 Id. at 181. Although the record does not provide the specific date that this
request was made, it appears that Austin Travel's decision to discontinue use of
United's Apollo CRS was a direct result of the letter from Eastern Airlines.
I'o

17
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fees.1 1 2 Austin Travel never paid United for the use of
equipment and services under any of the Apollo
contracts.' ,3
In 1987, United initiated an action in federal district
court seeking $423,155.09 for (1) accrued rentals, (2)
amounts stipulated in the liquidated damage clauses of
the CRS subscription contracts, and (3) consequential
damages resulting from breach of the contracts.' 1 4 Austin
Travel counterclaimed seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the subscription contracts were void
because of United's alleged monopoly power in the CRS
market." 5 Austin Travel also asserted that United's liquidated damage clauses were penalties and therefore
6
unenforceable."
United then filed for a motion for summary judgment.' 1 7 The district court granted United's summary
judgment ruling that Austin Travel had not introduced
sufficient evidence to support a genuine issue of fact and
that Austin Travel's defenses were frivolous." 8 The district court, therefore, ruled that United was entitled to re112 Id.

", Id. at 182.
,,4Id. at 181.

-, Id. at 178-79, 182-86. Austin Travel claimed that United's CRS agreements
were
part of an unlawful scheme to monopolize the local and national
markets for computerized reservation systems and airline passenger
services and to engage in unlawful anticompetitive practices in those
markets, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and §§ 2 and
3 of the Clayton Act.
Id. at 179. For an in-depth discussion of the antitrust issues in the CRS market,
see Comment, The Antitrust Implications of Computer Reservations Systems (CRS's), 51 J.

AIR L. & CoM. 157 (1985).
....
Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 186. The scope of this comment is
limited to this issue. For a complete discussion of antitrust issues, see Comment,
supra note 115, at 157.
,,7Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 178.
IId. at 179, 182. The court noted that Austin Travel's response to United's
motion included "five and one-half inches of briefs and appendices containing
governmental reports .... affidavits, letters, the lease agreements, their assignments and lengthy (yet sometimes misleading) depositions excerpts." Id. at 179.
The court continued: "The requisite evidence ...is found wanting. The defendant failed to submit admissible specific probative evidence in support of the relevant matter involved herein." Id. In fact, Austin Travel presented its own expert
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lief as a matter of law."t 9 Furthermore, the court ordered

Austin Travel to pay United $408,375.00 in damages plus
interest and costs.'

20

Of this amount, $269,684.66 repre-

sented the damages calculated under 2the liquidated damage provisions of the CRS contracts.' '
2.

United's Liquidated Damage Clause

Under its CRS subscription contract with Austin Travel,
United received a fixed monthly usage fee and a variable
fee charge for different uses such as ticket and itinerary
printing from the travel agency.'

22

United also received

fees of $1.85 per booking for each ticket sold through
Apollo. 123 When Austin Travel breached the subscription
contract, United lost the revenue from these charges and
fees as well as a fraction of its market share.' 2 4 The liquiwitness whose testimony disposed of the monopolization counterclaims. Id. at
180, 182-83.
,- Id. at 179. The court stated that "[slummary judgment will be rendered
only when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists" per rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
12() Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 191.
Interest was calculated from February 26, 1987, the day United filed the action in federal district court. Id. at 179,
191; cf. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 50, § 13:01 ("liquidated damage clause[s] ...
liquidate damages at the time of the breach so that prejudgment interest will begin to run immediately against the breaching party" (footnote omitted)).
"-" Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 191-92 attachment A. The $269,684.66
figure for the liquidated damages under the three CRS contracts is calculated as
follows:
62,102.70
$
Oceanside location
198,135.56
Mitchell Field location
9,446.40
Great Neck location
$ 269,684.66
TOTAL
122 Id. at 186; see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for discussion of
these fees.
123 Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 187, 191-92 attachment A. "Each time a
travel agent makes a booking on an airline or with another vendor through the
Apollo Services, that airline or vendor pays a booking fee to United." Id. at 187.
' See id. The court noted: "When an existing subscriber abandons Apollo
prior to expiration of the contract term, United does not recoup part of its loss by
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dated damage provision of the contract between United
and Austin Travel included a separate calculation for each
of the three elements. 125
United's contract with Austin Travel provided that in
case of breach:
Subscriber will pay to United liquidated damages in an
amount calculated as follows:
A. The amount of the monthly fixed charge... multiplied by the number of months, including any portion
thereof, remaining under the term of this Agreement and
the product thereof multiplied by .80;
B.

The amount of the variable charges . . . paid by

Subscriber for the calendar month immediately preceding
the date of termination . . .multiplied by the number of

months, including any portion thereof, remaining under
the terms of this Agreement and the product thereof multiplied by .80;
C. The Monthly Minimum Guarantee... multiplied by
the amount of the airline booking fee in effect on the date
of termination and the product thereof ... multiplied by
the product of the number of months, including any portion thereof, remaining under the term of this Agreement
multiplied by the number of Apollo CRTs .. .; and

D. The amount of the liquidated damages will equal
26

the sum of the amounts derived under [A., B., and C.].'

3.

Court's Rationale

The district court held that, under New York law, liquidated damage clauses should be sustained if (1) the actual
placing the subscriber's equipment elsewhere ....United loses the entire amount
of the subscriber's business." Id.
12
Id. at 186 n.5.
121i Id. Only eighty percent of the fixed and variable charges were stipulated to
be recovered under parts A and B of the liquidated damage clause because United
determined through consultation with personnel at Apollo Services that, once
equipment was removed from an agency, United would avoid approximately
twenty percent of the costs associated with the revenues. Id. at 187. "The
Monthly Minimum Guarantee" in part C is the level of business United's CRS
contracts require. Id. This figure is set at "50 percent of the average level of bookings the agent made in the early months of its contract." Id.
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damages are uncertain and difficult to prove and (2) the
stipulated amount is not unreasonable or disproportionate to the anticipated loss. 12 7 In analyzing the first requirement, the court analogized the uncertainty involved
in proving damages resulting from a breach of a CRS contract to the speculative nature of assessing the value of
repossessed trucks and heavy equipment.12 The court
cited Leasing Service Corp. v. Justice,12 9 in which the Second
Circuit upheld a liquidated damage clause of a lease
agreement which allowed a lessor to sell repossessed
equipment and then to deduct fifteen percent of the accelerated lease payments from the sale proceeds before applying the proceeds to the balance payable to the
lessor. 130 The lease also provided that the lessor could
retain the equipment at the end of the lease term.' 3 ' In
Leasing Service Corp., the Second Circuit reasoned that,
since the residual value of equipment at the end of a contract depended on the physical condition of the equipment and the current market demand, the value could not
be precisely estimated, and therefore, fifteen percent of
the accelerated lease payments was reasonable. 3 2 Thus,
1'2

Id. The court held:

where the actual damages are certain and difficult to ascertain or
prove, or are of a peculiarly speculative character, and the contract
furnishes no data for their ascertainment, a stipulated amount which
on the face of the contract does not appear to be unreasonable or
disproportionate to the probable loss will be held to be one for liquidated damages rather than a penalty.
Id. (citation omitted). This test for the validity of liquidated damage clauses is
based on the common law and section 339 of the first Restatement. In both common law and Restatement jurisdictions, evidence of actual loss is not considered
when evaluating the reasonableness of a liquidated damage clause. See supra notes
32-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two approaches.
12s Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 187-88, citing Leasing Serv. Corp. v.
Justice, 673 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982).
121.

673 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982).

... Id. at 73. The Second Circuit applied the following standard: "[c]ontractual
provisions fixing liquidated damages in the event of breach will not be voided as
unconscionable or contrary to public policy if the amount liquidated bears a reasonable proportion to the probable loss and the amount of actual loss is incapable
or difficult of precise estimation." Id. (citation omitted).
-t Id. at 72.
.... Id. at 74. In reaching its decision, the court held that "[slince [the residual]
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the court in Austin Travel Corp. stated that United's losses
under the CRS contracts were just as speculative and difficult to prove.33
As for the requirement that the stipulated amount is not
unreasonable or disproportionate to the anticipated loss,
the court focused on the CRS industry's custom of including liquidated damage clauses in subscription contracts
and decided that United's clause was a standard clause. 34
Equating custom with reasonableness, the court also
pointed out that United only sought to recover eighty percent of the fixed and variable charges, compared to other
system vendors which seek recovery of the full amount. 35
This practice demonstrated to the court that United had a
reasonable basis for recovery of the lost revenues and the
terms constituted a "genuine pre-estimation" of
damages. 116
In concluding its discussion of liquidated damages, the
court also noted that prudent business persons had made
the estimate of probable damages and had agreed to the
provision at the time they entered the contract. 37 The
court further commented that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the liquidated amount was reasonable
in relation to the probable loss.138
value is incapable of precise estimation .. and may in fact fluctuate radically over

time, the lease agreement's provision of fifteen percent of the total rent as a reasonable estimation of the residual value of the equipment is far from being unconscionable." Id. (citation omitted).
'. Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 188 ("Clearly the actual damages from
the breach of contract were uncertain when the parties sat down to contract and
were difficult both to ascertain or prove thereafter ....").
,.4Id. ("The Court is convinced that the United liquidated damage clause is
standard and vindicated by industry practice.").
,:,Id. ("Indeed, the CRS contracts of the competitors of United were even
more stringent; they called for payment of 100% of the rentals . . .while the
United contract obligated Austin for only 80%.
I-

Id.

,:'7
Id. The court noted that the liquidated damage clauses were agreed to "by
sophisticated parties fully aware of the terms and nature of the injury that would
be caused by a future breach of the lease." Id.
'" Id. The court stated:
Defendant has failed to show the existence of any proof available to
it to the contrary. The disputable analysis of presumed cost savings
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Court of Appeals Decision

In affirming the district court's summary judgment in
favor of United, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals basically adopted the lower court's opinion. 3 9 After reiterating the two-part Leasing Service Corp. 4 test for the
enforceability of a liquidated damage clause, 141 the circuit
court found that United's damage provision was valid because it was reasonable at the time the parties executed
the contract. 142 The circuit court further equated industry
custom to reasonableness and upheld the enforceability of
the liquidated damage clause. 43 The court, however, did
not address the second part of the Leasing Service Corp. test
which requires that the actual damages be difficult to estimate precisely.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Since Austin Travel Corp. is one of the few published
opinions that has dealt with the issue of liquidated damage clauses in CRS contracts, it is difficult to ascertain its
precedential value on other circuits.

44

For instance,

belatedly submitted by Austin does not discredit the reasonablenss
of United's anticipatory estimate in light of the anticipated or actual
loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof.
Id.
131,Austin Travel Corp. H, 867 F.2d at 740-41.
14.. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982).
,41 Austin Travel Corp. H, 867 F.2d at 740 (citing Leasing Serv. Corp., 673 F.2d at
73). "Liquidated damages are not penalties if they bear a 'reasonable proportion
to the probable loss and the amount of actual loss is incapable or difficult of precise estimation.'" Id.
142 Id.
14:1 Id. at 740-41. The circuit court repeated the district court's reasoning that
since United only required 80% of the fixed and variable fees, as compared to
competitors' requirement for 100% of these fees, United's liquidated damage
provisions were reasonable. Id. at 740. The court went as far as to state:
"[i]ndeed, the liquidated damages provisions edge closer toward overgenerousness to Austin than they do toward unreasonableness." Id. at 740-41.
144 See In re "APOLLO" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System (CRS),
720 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); cf Godwin, Dim Outlook, supra note 1, at 1, 4 (a
U.S. District Court in San Diego ruled that a PARS' (Northwest Airlines and
TWA's CRS) liquidated damage clause was an unenforceable penalty). But cf
Godwin,Judge Backs UAL in Agency Res Case, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Dec. 12, 1988, at 1 (a
federal district court in San Francisco held Campus Travel liable to United for
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some courts might hold that the provision was a penalty
because the financial burden placed on the travel agency
by the amount of the damages would tend to compel performance to the end of the contract.' 45 Other courts
might classify United's liquidated damage clause as part
liquidated damages and part penalities by enforcing the
acceleration clause on the monthly service fees and voiding the clauses which provide recovery of lost booking
fees and lost variable fees.
Furthermore, other circuits may not place much weight
on the the decision because the district court did not
make an in depth legal analysis of the issue of the enforceability of the liquidated damage clause. Instead, the district court relied on equitable considerations and broad
conclusory statements. The district court basically relied
on the fact that Austin Travel had failed to pay anything at
all under the Apollo contracts as a "fairness" advantage
for United. 146 The district court also made conclusory remarks throughout its opinion. It described Austin
Travel's claims and defenses as "frivolous,"' 47 "misleading,"'48 "inflated," 49 and "bald contentions."' 0
Proper analysis of these provisions should have in$229,212 in liquidated damages for the'agency's breach of its Apollo contract);
The Dallas Morning News, Sept. 6, 1989, at 3D, col. 1 (in a Dallas U.S. District
Court, American Airlines won over $700,000 against eight former SABRE travel
agencies for breach of CRS contracts). For a discussion of In re "APOLLO," see
supra note 97.
1'4. See Belitsos, supra note 2, at 41.
The article reported that the cost of switching CRS systems for "a large travel agency can run into millions .
Id
'41 Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 181, 188-89.
,47Id. at 182, 185. The court stated that "Austin frivolously contends that
[United] did not give notice of breach or an opportunity to cure and ... fail[ed] to
identify the nature of the breach." Id. at 182. The court further found that Austin's allegations of United monopolization of the CRS market was "frivolous and
had no basis in fact." Id.at 185; accordGodwin, Dim Outlook, supra note 1, at 4. In
Godwin's article, an attorney familiar with the travel industry noted that SystemOne (the third largest CRS vendor) made a mistake in accusing United (the
second largest CRS vendor) of monopolization. Godwin, Dim Outlook, supra note
1, at 4. He continued by stating, "[wlith frivolous arguments, you hurt other
claims[.]" Id.
14s Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 179. The court concluded that Austin
Travel's response to United's motion for summary judgment included "misleading[] deposition excerpts." Id.
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cluded an application of the test for the validity of a liquidated damage clause cited in the opinion and a
comparison of CRS contracts to various types of contracts
in which liquidated damage clauses are upheld. Instead,
the district court in Austin Travel Corp. analogized the difficulty of calculating and proving damages to the uncertainty associated with valuing used equipment. 5 ' The
district court continued with its analysis of the liquidated
damages by equating reasonableness of the predetermined amount to custom in the CRS industry.'
Simply
because the industry has a standard practice does not necessarily make that practice reasonable. It only indicates
that no one has successfully challenged the practice or
that no one has found an alternative.
The following is a recommended analysis of the liquidated damage provision which another jurisdiction might
very well apply to a case similar to Austin Travel Corp. Each
section will address the different elements of the liquidated damage clause in the CRS subscription contract between United and Austin Travel. United's provision
provided for recovery of fixed monthly fees, variable fees,
and lost booking
fees if the travel agency breached the
53
contract.
A.

Acceleration Clause on Fixed Monthly Fees

In Austin Travel Corp., the parties had agreed to an acceleration clause that totaled the monthly or periodic payments remaining under a contract and made the balance
due upon default or breach. 54 Such clauses are found in
149 Id. at 185.
The court found that Austin Travel's "inflated papers" mentioned no injury to competition by United's alleged monopoly power. Id.
150 Id. "The alleged antitrust violations are mere bald contentions without any
admissible specifically identifiable evidence .... Id.
-1 See supra notes 127-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's

analysis.
1:"2 Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 188; see supra notes 134-136 and accom-

panying text.
-.1 Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 186 n.5; see supra notes 122-126 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these clauses.
15
E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 8.18, at 620.
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real estate or equipment leases, installment payment contracts, and any contract where payment of some debt is
spread over a period of time.1 55 In analyzing acceleration
clauses outside the context of liquidated damages, courts
usually hold that such clauses are valid based on the public policy consideration that courts should avoid unnecessary legal costs for a plaintiff who would otherwise have to
sue each month or payment period to collect on the
agreement. Thus, courts that analyze the acceleration of
monthly service fees as a "typical" acceleration clause
would hold such clauses valid.1 56
Under a liquidated damages analysis, a court also would
probably uphold the acceleration clause in a CRS contract. The court would first evaluate the uncertainty or
difficulty of proof of loss upon a breach of the CRS contract. Since the acceleration of monthly service fees provides for simple addition of the remaining payments to
determine the amount due, a court may be reluctant to
enforce the clause because it does not satisfy the requirement that the damages are to be uncertain and difficult to
prove. The court would realize, however, that unless the
parties include acceleration clauses in installment payment contracts, the system vendor must wait until each
separate payment is due before asserting an action for the
amount of the payment. 5 7 Thus, the system vendor has a
valid argument that the requirement of uncertainty and
difficulty of proof is merely a factor to consider, rather
than a condition necessary for enforcement, in determining the validity of the clause.15
A court would also evaluate the reasonableness of the
stipulated amount in relation to the probable loss. Since
acceleration of the balance is equal to the amount the sys'5r, See generally id. § 8.18, at 619-20.

,r"For a discussion of acceleration clauses, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
157 E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 8.18, at 619-20.
15,See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the
uncertainty and difficulty of proof factor and its role in the analysis of liquidated
damage clauses.
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tern vendor will lose upon breach of the contract, the
amount is reasonable in relation to both the anticipated
and actual loss. Furthermore, when the amount due is expressed as a formula based on the number of outstanding
months in the contract, 5 9 the amount is reasonable
whether judged at the time of contract, the time of
breach, or the time of trial. Therefore, in the absence of
unconscionability or other illegality, courts would probably uphold the acceleration clause of the monthly fixed
service fees.
B.

Recovery of Variable Fees

The parties in Austin Travel Corp. included in their contract a provision for recovery of variable fees which are
the charges travel agencies pay to the system vendors for
use of the CRS equipment to print tickets and travel itineraries. These fees are paid in addition to monthly usage
or service fees.' 6 ° Proper analysis of this component of
United's liquidated damages indicates that the court in
Austin Travel Corp. erred because courts should not enforce the provisions which allow recovery of the variable
fees.
Under a strict liquidated damages analysis, it appears
that the loss of variable fees is a loss which is uncertain
and difficult to prove. The damages from a breach are
uncertain because the parties have no way to predict the
exact amount of business and variable charges a travel
agency will incur over the life of a contract. In addition,
the provision sets out another formula which attempts to
make a reasonable estimate of the probable variable
charges. It is not altogether clear, however, that the
formula results in a reasonable damage amount.
159 See Austin Travel Corp. 1, 681 F. Supp. at 186 n.5. Footnote 5 of the court's
opinion sets out the liquidated damage provisions of United's CRS contracts. Id.
Most CRS contracts will probably have similar formulas because recoverable fees
and charges must be calculated based on the number of months remaining on the
contract.
-,, See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of these fees.
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The Department of Transportation regulations provide
that a system vendor cannot require a subscriber to use its
CRS to sell its tickets.' 6 ' A reasonable inference would be
that the system vendor cannot require the use of its system to sell any tickets. Therefore, if a subscriber decided
that it did not like a particular CRS, the subscriber could
stop using the system. In this situation, the subscriber
would not incur any variable expenses and would continue to pay only the monthly service fees to the system
vendor for the remainder of the contract term. Consequently, the system vendor would
realize only the
162
monthly fees from the contract.
Furthermore, an overriding principle of contract remedies is to compensate the injured party for loss of the ben63
efit of the bargain, not to penalize the breaching party.
If a court enforces the variable fee recovery provision like
in Austin Travel Corp., the system vendor recovers more
than the benefit of its bargain. The very nature of the
fees-variable-indicates that the system vendor expects
this amount to vary from month to month. A travel agent
could possibly have no business and therefore incur no
variable fees. Therefore, requiring a travel agency to pay
estimated variable fees for early termination of the CRS
contract would amount to a penalty rather than a measure
of damages for an anticipated breach.
On the other hand, a CRS vendor could argue that a
travel agency would not let a CRS sit idle. Most travel
agencies cannot operate efficiently and effectively without
a CRS, and most agencies could not afford more than one
'"i 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(c) (1989). This section provides: "No system vendor shall
require use of its system, by the subscriber in any sale of its air transportation
services." Id.
,w' The result, however, may be different in a situation where the parties agree
to a contract provision which sets a minimum monthly level of use. Although this
seems contrary to the Department of Transportation regulations, section 255.6(c)
is probably meant to prevent a carrier from requiring the use of its CRS as a
condition before selling its tickets. See supra note 161 for the language of section
255.6(c).
-.. E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 12.1, at 814; Note, supra note 11, at 862;
Comment, supra note 10, at 123.
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CRS. Thus, more likely than not, a CRS vendor would
receive variable fees from a travel agency and would end
up losing them because of the travel agency's breach of
the contract.
In Austin Travel Corp., however, Austin Travel contracted with two CRS vendors at its Great Neck and
Oceanside locations t64 and with three CRS vendors at its
Mitchell Field location.165 This allowed Austin Travel to
ignore the Apollo CRS with no significant impact on its
business. The Austin Travel Corp. court, therefore, should
have analyzed the issue in light of this special fact
situation.
C.

Recovery of Booking Fees

In Austin Travel Corp., the parties' contract also provided
for the recovery of booking fees. Booking fees are the
fees the participating carriers pay to contracting CRS vendors for each booking made by a subscriber through the
CRS.16 6 As with variable fees, booking fees satisfy one requirement for upholding the liquidated damage provisions because neither party to the CRS contract can
accurately estimate the amount of booking fees a CRS
vendor will receive over the life of a subscription contract.
One problem, however, with requiring a breaching subscriber to pay these lost booking fees is that the subscriber is never responsible for payment of these amounts
under its contract. Instead, the participating carrier pays
these fees. 16 7 Another problem is that since the travel
16
agency is not required to sell tickets through the CRS,'
the system vendor does not necessarily realize any book""The two CRS vendors were American Airlines and United Airlines. Austin
Travel Corp. 1,681 F. Supp. at 181.
165 The three CRS vendors were American Airlines, United Airlines, and Texas
Air. Id. at 181-82.
-.;See Mifsud, supra note 89, at 146; supra notes 87-91 for a discussion of booking fees.
-1 See Austin Travel Corp. I, 681 F. Supp. at 187. See generally Mifsud, supra note
89, at 146.
I- See supra note 161 and accompanying text. But see supra note 162.
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ing fees under the contract. Thus, enforcing a booking
fee provision and allowing recovery of these fees allows
the system vendor a greater damage recovery than its lost
expectations and imposes a penalty upon the travel
agency.
V.

CONCLUSION

Like the court in Austin Travel Corp., courts should enforce CRS contract liquidated damage clauses to the extent that they allow for acceleration of the fixed monthly
service fees and recovery of the CRS equipment removal
fees. If acceleration clauses are not upheld, the result
would be contrary to the public policy which favors the
efficient use of courts because the system vendor would
have to bring an action for each installment as it became
due. Furthermore, these clauses give the vendor the benefit of its bargain.
Courts, however, should not follow the holding in Austin Travel Corp. with regard to the recovery of lost variable
fees and lost booking fees. The Austin Travel Corp. court
failed to adequately address the issues regarding these
provisions and merely accepted them as reasonable.
These provisions are unenforceable penalties in that they
compel performance of the contract because of the financial burden they place on the travel agencies. In addition,
these provisions allow recovery of amounts a CRS vendor
many not have realized had the travel agencies simply
stopped using the CRS. Furthermore, the court did not
consider public policy issues surrounding the CRS market. The proposed result allows travel agencies greater
flexibility in choosing a CRS. Often, agencies do not
switch systems because of the financial burden of the liquidated damage clauses even when another CRS would
better meet the agencies' and markets' demands.' 69 Thus,
Belitsos, supra note 2, at 36. The report notes that "[t]he major reason
agencies undergo the trauma of changing CRSs before a contract ends is market
geography. Agencies may want to change if a new airline becomes the major carrier in its area." Id.
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prohibiting these liquidated damage clauses may also encourage development of better CRS which in turn would
benefit the traveling public.

